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The World Court’s Fractured Ruling
on Genocide
David Scheffer
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw / Robert A. Helman Professor of
Law and Director, Center for International Human Rights,
Northwestern University School of Law
In February 2007 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a lengthy
judgment in a major genocide case, Bosnia v. Serbia, arising from the Balkans war
of the early 1990s. Two of the ICJ’s unprecedented rulings are major advancements
for enforcement of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (UNCG). First, the Serbian state was found to be in violation of its
art. 1 obligation to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. This is a significant
boost for both the UNCG and the emerging legal principle of the responsibility to
protect civilian populations at risk of atrocity crimes. Second, the ICJ ruled that a
state, and not only individuals, can be found responsible for genocide, conspiracy to
commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to
commit genocide, or complicity in genocide. Despite these encouraging rulings,
however, the ICJ’s majority judgment exhibits several serious shortcomings.
The first is the majority’s failure to develop a state-centric methodology to
determine any inference of genocidal intent by the Serbian government. The judges
failed to obtain and examine evidence that might have pointed demonstrably to
such inference of intent. The second is the majority’s misinterpretation of the crime
of complicity in genocide, particularly as it relates to state responsibility: the
majority erroneously equated complicity with aiding and abetting and failed to
distinguish, in the context of complicity, between specific intent to commit genocide
and the motive to do so. Third, the ICJ has missed an opportunity to point out
emphatically that its finding on genocide, or the lack thereof, with respect to the
state of Serbia reveals a significant gap in international law. While constructively
finding that the UNCG can trigger state responsibility for genocide, the ICJ’s
judgment shows how deficient international law is in holding states responsible
for crimes against humanity and war crimes. One is left pondering the ‘‘what ifs’’
in the result and wondering how the international community can now move
forward to draft new treaties that would establish the means to enforce state
responsibility for all atrocity crimes.

The multiplicity of issues erupting from the recent judgment of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) in the Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro)1 leaves one pondering ‘‘what if ?’’ with the turn of every one of
the 171 single-spaced pages of the majority’s views. What if there had been a judgment
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in
Milosˇevic´ 2 following his lengthy trial on charges of genocide, a profoundly important
judgment aborted, shortly before the trial’s end, by Slobodan Milošević’s sudden death?
What if certain evidence provided by the Serbian government to the ICTY in Milosˇevic´
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had been turned over to the ICJ for its own study? What if the ICJ had had the
jurisdiction, in Bosnia v. Serbia, to examine state responsibility for crimes against
humanity and war crimes?
Among a few of the dissenting judges, one is inspired to ask, ‘‘Whither common
sense in genocide litigation?’’ Though good-faith analysis abounds in both the
majority’s and the dissenting judges’ writings, they were constrained by the
exceptionally narrow prism of genocide through which all responsibility was judged.
There is an almost surreal texture to much of the majority judgment, in particular—as
if the judges were mesmerized by the fog of the evidence presented to them rather than
being enlightened by the overall reality of what occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina
from 1991 through 1995, which the whole world witnessed, and by the way
governments, and not just individuals, dictated the carnage. I write these words
knowing full well that the judges are duty bound to evaluate the evidence, or lack
thereof, and not to speculate as to the facts or extend themselves beyond the
jurisdictional boundaries of the parties’ applications. But in the realm of genocide, the
ICJ lost itself in a thicket of legal reasoning strangely distant from reality.
There is no question that the ICJ’s majority judgment contains two very significant
advancements for the enforcement of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG).3 The first such development is the
unprecedented finding that Serbia failed in its art. 1 obligation to prevent and punish
the crime of genocide.4 The emerging legal principle of the responsibility to protect
civilian populations at risk of atrocity crimes5 will be greatly strengthened as
governments weigh the possible consequences of failing to take action to prevent
genocide, particularly when instructed to do so in ICJ provisional measures, or of
failing to punish those individuals responsible for the crime. It is to be hoped that the
ICJ’s judgment will inspire national legal systems—and, ultimately, lead to future
legislation and judicial decisions—to hold their own governments to the high standard
of prevention and punishment now reflected in the ICJ’s enforcement of the UNCG.
The judgment may also inspire further applications to the ICJ to address other failures
by states parties to the UNCG to exercise their responsibility to prevent and punish
the crime of genocide.
The second critical achievement of the majority judgment is the recognition that a
state, not just an individual, can be held responsible under the UNCG for genocide,
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide,
attempt to commit genocide, or complicity in genocide.6 The confusion over whether
the convention reaches to state responsibility, particularly beyond art. 1 obligations,
has been ended by the majority.7 Several judges disagreed,8 and scholars will doubtless
continue to debate the point. But I for one am relieved that the ICJ delivered the
fundamental reality check that, obviously and logically, the UNCG covers state
responsibility. The alternative interpretation—that the drafting history and text of the
convention reflect no such intention—is important to reflect upon, but it is a perverse
distortion of how, in most instances, individuals actually commit the crime of genocide:
they do so as agents of a state, which cannot itself escape responsibility without
rendering the UNCG little more than a shield for state-sponsored genocide.
In this article, however, I want to focus on some serious shortcomings in the ICJ’s
majority judgment in Bosnia v. Serbia. The first is the majority’s failure to infer
genocidal intent on the part of the Serbian government and to obtain and examine
evidence that might have pointed demonstrably at least to such inference of intent.
The second is the majority’s interpretation of the crime of complicity in genocide,
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particularly as it relates to state responsibility. Third, the elephant in the room that
cripples the ICJ’s ability to properly determine state responsibility beyond the UNCG
is the lack of any comparable international treaty covering crimes against humanity
and war crimes. The result is an artificial exercise in legal masochism that has the
practical effect of absolving a government of its responsibility for atrocity crimes
simply because codified criteria for the crime of genocide have not been met.
Nothing exists in treaty law to bridge the enormous gap between the criminal law
covering individuals and the void that enables outrageous state-sponsored or stateinfluenced conduct (other than genocide) to go unchecked in courts of law.

The ICJ’s Failure to Infer the Intent to Commit Genocide
Rather than investigate and analyze the totality of violent events that engulfed the
people of Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1991 and 1995, the ICJ chose to
disaggregate its analysis into an investigation of whether, for each individual incident
presented as evidence to the court, the specific intent required for a finding of the
crime of genocide could be conclusively shown.9 Central to the court’s failure to
establish specific intent was the fact that it did not find such necessary intent for any
individual engaged in any specific incident other than the Srebrenica massacres of
July 1995. The majority relied heavily on the jurisprudence of the ICTY, which
prosecutes only individuals and which has not found the requisite intent to commit
genocide except in the Krstic´ judgment pertaining to Srebrenica.10 The high standard
of proof for establishing the specific intent of genocide under principles of individual
criminal responsibility does not necessarily hold for state responsibility, where the
standard of proof is necessarily of a different character than that applied to individual
perpetrators confronting a loss of liberty, or possibly even a death sentence,
as punishment.
At one point the ICJ quotes the famous dictum from the Nuremberg trials, that
‘‘[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract
entities . . .’’11 Yet the majority shrank from the equally important truth that it had
largely established (albeit with the terminology of state responsibility) earlier in its
judgment: atrocity crimes are committed by governments and other abstract entities,
and only rarely by men alone. In order to properly analyze whether a government or
any part thereof acted with the specific intent to commit genocide, the most plausible
methodology is to establish the inference of specific intent by examining the evidence
of a multiplicity and pattern of events and then understanding how such events can be
explained by exposing direct and indirect linkages to the suspect government.
A mystery tour through the psyches of political or military leaders is not essential to
the task of discovering the requisite mens rea of inferential intent for state-sponsored
genocide.
There is nothing revolutionary in establishing the inference of intent as the mens
rea of genocide. The ad hoc tribunals have been discovering inferred intent of genocide
with respect to individuals for years.12 There is no reason that the ICJ could not have
employed a similar methodology, adjusted for state-centric analysis, with respect to
Serbia and Montenegro. Unfortunately, the majority searched for the inference of
intent as if it were discoverable only by examining individual perpetrators (in the
spirit of the ad hoc tribunals) and determining whether and how each person’s
intentions could be inferred. Failing to meet that identical test for a state, the ICJ
surrendered the playing field to the complexity of the crime itself. The court failed to
employ any methodology that seeks evidence of the inference of intent to commit
125
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genocide in the actions, events, circumstances, policies, omissions, and rhetoric of a
government acting in its collective capacity, notwithstanding that an individual leader
may be targeted for criminal responsibility before a separate court of criminal
jurisdiction.
Significantly, as discussed above, the majority judgment confirms a key principle:
there is authority in the UNCG for the finding of state responsibility for the crime of
genocide, albeit not as a matter of criminal culpability but only as ‘‘the responsibility
of States simpliciter.’’13 In critical part,
Accordingly, having considered the various arguments, the Court affirms that the
Contracting Parties are bound by the obligation under the Convention not to commit,
through their organs or persons or groups whose conduct is attributable to them,
genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III. Thus if an organ of the State, or a
person or group whose acts are legally attributable to the State, commits any of the acts
proscribed by Article III of the Convention, the international responsibility of that
State is incurred.14

The logic behind this finding does not point only to the broader interpretation of the
UNCG as a legal instrument of accountability for states as well as individuals. There
also is the pragmatic reality that the convention can achieve this broader
interpretation only if the specific-intent requirement for the crime of genocide is one
that can be inferred with respect to the overall conduct (at least extending
beyond individual incidents to an aggregate of incidents) of a government bound by
the treaty.
However, the majority in Bosnia v. Serbia concludes that, ‘‘save for the events of
July 1995 at Srebrenica, the necessary intent required to constitute genocide has not
been conclusively shown in relation to each specific intent.’’15 They establish three
avenues by which such evidence could be demonstrated: (1) on the part of the
individual perpetrators, although that would not necessarily demonstrate governmental responsibility; (2) on the basis of a concerted plan; or (3) on the basis that the
events reviewed in the matter reveal a consistent pattern of conduct that can only
point to the existence of such intent.16 Because the focus of intent was shifted from the
individual perpetrators (option 1) to higher governmental authority or to the Serbian
government itself (options 2 and 3), Bosnia had to show either an official statement of
aims reflecting a genocidal intent or a pattern of conduct. The court found
unpersuasive the evidence presented under either requirement. But the court suffered
from its own investigative shortcomings and its inability, or unwillingness, to connect
the dots with the kind of reasoned analysis one might have expected of the highest
court of international law.
The key paragraphs (370–76) of the majority’s decision hardly demonstrate the
kind of rigorous investigative and analytical exercise required to establish whether a
government’s specific intent to commit genocide can be inferred. As the ICJ notes,
Bosnia’s assertions shift from the intent of individual perpetrators to the intent of
higher authority.17 A singular truth about inference of intent is that clear and
unambiguous statements of intent, including in any official statement of aims, likely
will not be found. So when the court noticed that, in Republika Srpska President
Momcilo Krajisnik’s Decision on Strategic Goals of 12 May 1992, the ‘‘objectives do not
include the elimination of the Bosnian Muslim population,’’ one gropes for a reality
check. Would it surprise anyone that there is no such blatant statement in writing?!
Of course the document ‘‘does not necessarily involve the intent to destroy in whole or
in part the Muslim population in the enclaves,’’ as the majority held (emphasis added).
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But if one combines the highly suggestive (shall we say coded?) signals sent in that
particular document with the cascade of murderous and destructive operations on the
ground over a number of years, the uniquely integrated character of Serb and Bosnian
Serb military forces, and the many journeys of Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić
back and forth to Belgrade to check in with the Serb leadership, the strong possibility,
if not reality, of genocide knocks very loudly at the ICJ’s door.
The court bends over backward to presume a different intent by the Bosnian Serb
leadership—namely, the expulsion of the Bosnian Muslims and other communities.18
That discretionary choice could have gone the other way, with the court leaning toward
a presumption of intent to commit genocide on the part of the Bosnian Serb leaders and
then investigating their linkages to the Belgrade leadership. The court notes that the
ICTY has not characterized the Strategic Goals as genocidal, which certainly is
interesting, but in the context of state responsibility the ICTY’s findings are a footnote.
The real story, which the ICJ failed to investigate, is how the Strategic Goals form part
of a larger mosaic of policy statements, leadership rhetoric, and collaborative
relationships and conduct (including the failure to act at critical stages) between
Belgrade and Pale, and their respective militaries, over a number of years.19 This is
where the evidence held by the ICTY in the Milosˇević case might have proved critical,
if only the ICJ had been more aggressive and more patient in seeking to acquire it.20
What if, for example, the ICJ had dared to subpoena Serbia for the critical minutes of
its Supreme Defense Council? What if the ICJ had sought the assistance of major
governments to pressure Belgrade to authorize the ICTY to release the Serbian
government documents it held in the Milosˇević case to the ICJ, in their entirety and
unredacted? Under the Statute of the ICJ, the court has clear authority to investigate
and proactively seek such evidence,21 yet there appears to have been no discernible
action on the part of the court to obtain this evidence.22 Sadly, the passive character
of the ICJ’s investigative endeavors reflects an entrenched habit.
There also was no attempt by the ICJ to examine the totality of the evidence
presented during the Milosˇevic´ trial and determine whether such evidence might point
to Serbian state responsibility for actions that might have been interpreted as part of a
genocidal campaign in Bosnia. The fact that Slobodan Milošević died before judgment
was rendered in his trial does not negate the existence of such evidence. His untimely
death simply means that a final judgment will never be reached on his personal
conduct. But there is a wealth of evidence from his trial that the ICJ, examining state
conduct, would find very instructive. The Milosˇevic´ trial testimony of former US
general Wesley Clark, which recounts his conversation with Milošević during the
Dayton peace talks in late 1995,23 is used by the ICJ majority only to help prove that
Serbia failed in its state responsibility to prevent the genocide at Srebrenica.24
Yet Clark’s exchange with Milošević could have pointed to broader state responsibility
behind the genocide at Srebrenica if examined as part of a larger tapestry of
statements and actions.25
Another example of highly suspect Serbian connections with the Srebrenica
genocide involved the actions of the ‘‘Scorpions,’’ their description as ‘‘a unit of Ministry
of Interiors [sic] of Serbia,’’ and a videotape showing a Scorpion paramilitary unit
leading six Muslim prisoners—young men and boys—off to their deaths.26 Presented
in this context was the declaration made by the Council of Ministers of Serbia on
15 June 2005, which read in part,
Those who committed the killings in Srebrenica, as well as those who ordered and
organized that massacre represented neither Serbia nor Montenegro, but an
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undemocratic regime of terror and death, against whom the majority of citizens of
Serbia and Montenegro put up the strongest resistance.27

That declaration should have set off some alarm bells in the Peace Palace, warning the
court to dig deeper, much deeper, to find evidence of Serbian government complicity, at
a minimum, in the genocide at Srebrenica and perhaps beyond. Instead, the ICJ
majority considered the statement to be a political one that does not constitute an
admission of responsibility for the Srebrenica massacres.28
The easiest analysis of the Clark–Milošević exchange and the actions of the
Scorpions at Srebrenica is to take them in isolation, as the majority did, and to show
how neither demonstrates conclusively either direct or inferential genocidal intent.
The harder, but more important, analysis would be to weave these two events into a
more comprehensive and coherent study of the years of collaborative actions and
omissions facilitating genocide that may have existed between some Bosnian Serb
leaders and some Serbian leaders in Belgrade. The ICJ analysis is reminiscent of how
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur looked at certain isolated events
and the identities of certain victims and concluded that neither genocide nor even any
genocidal policy existed with respect to Darfur.29 If one were to search for an easy way
for judges and lawyers to avoid the reality of state responsibility for genocide, both the
ICJ majority and the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur discovered it in
spades—to the detriment of genocide studies, UNCG enforcement, and genocide
prevention for years to come.
The ICJ’s third option for discovering the specific intent of a state is framed with
an almost impossible standard of proof:
The dolus specialis, the specific intent to destroy the group in whole or in part, has to be
convincingly shown by reference to particular circumstances, unless a general plan to
that end can be convincingly demonstrated to exist; and for a pattern of conduct to
be accepted as evidence of its existence, it would have to be such that it could only point
to the existence of such intent.30

One might interpret this view to mean that only the intent to commit genocide must
explain the atrocity. There are clear precedents of genocide in world history, but to
state that a pattern of conduct can be ruled as genocide provided that its only
characteristic is that of genocide would be patently absurd. One must presume that,
while the ICJ would require that an intent to commit genocide be demonstrated in
order to hold a state responsible for genocide, the elements of crimes against humanity
and war crimes might also be found relating to the same situation under scrutiny.
Unfortunately, the ICJ may have delivered the impression—if not an outright
ruling—that only genocide must constitute the state’s intended action.
The ICJ dismisses this third option by concluding that its failure to find the specific
intent of genocide by the perpetrators of individual atrocities complained of by Bosnia,
as well as the ICTY’s record of no convictions on genocide other than for Srebrenica,
fails to establish intent on the part of the Serbian government.31 There is no attempt
by the ICJ to understand what the aggregate of ‘‘widespread and serious atrocities’’
might mean in interpreting a government’s overall policy and the inferences that could
be drawn from it. The result of such an exercise may be that no inferential intent to
commit genocide existed in Belgrade from 1991 to 1995. But one would have expected
the ICJ to make a serious effort to determine any such inferential intent, even if that
meant traversing new terrain in ICJ jurisprudence to create a methodology that not
only is faithful to the totality of facts but also understands that there is a distinction
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between how one judges a government’s performance and how one judges that of an
individual perpetrator. As ICJ Vice-President Al-Khasawneh writes in dissent,
[T]he Court has refused to infer genocidal intent from the consistent pattern of conduct
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In its reasoning, the Court relies heavily on several
arguments, each of which is inadequate for the purpose, and contradictory to the
consistent jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals.32

Essentially, the ICJ sought to find governmental responsibility by building a pyramid
of incidents revealing the specific intent to commit genocide—and only genocide—by
individual perpetrators, all of whom must be associated with the respondent
government, Serbia. A far more pragmatic methodology would be to require proof of
the inference of genocidal intent through the totality of atrocities and how they could
be plausibly understood as the natural consequence of specific intent within and by the
government to commit genocide.

Complicity in Genocide
The ICJ’s failure to conduct a proper examination of the inference of intent to commit
genocide is directly tied to another significant failure: the court’s flawed examination
of complicity in the commission of genocide. I would argue that the two exercises—
establishing the inference of a government’s intent and finding complicity—are deeply
intertwined analytical exercises and can point to state responsibility if properly
undertaken.
The court sought to interpret complicity by referring to the International Law
Commission’s proposed articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts (particularly art. 16),33 then erroneously using that document to
define complicity of a state in committing genocide.34 The two bodies of principles—the
first not having been brought into force by treaty law or enforceable as customary
international law, the second being both treaty law and customary international law—
are apples and oranges. Even if some may conclude that the ILC was attempting to
establish state responsibility for criminal conduct, including genocide, in drafting the
articles on state responsibility, the ILC did not, and has not yet, supplanted the UNCG
in determining the commission of genocide and how it was perpetrated and
facilitated.35 Yet the ICJ finds no reason
to make any distinction of substance between ‘‘complicity in genocide,’’ within the
meaning of Article III, paragraph (e), of the Convention, and the ‘‘aid or assistance’’ of a
State in the commission of a wrongful act by another State within the meaning of the
aforementioned Article 16.36

This conclusion is highly suspect and reflects a misguided reliance on a source—Article
16 of the ILC document—that has no legal standing and yet plays a leading role in the
court’s investigation of the crime of genocide. According to the ICJ, the key test for
complicity in genocide requires the court to ‘‘examine whether organs of the
Respondent State, or persons acting on its instructions or under its direction or
effective control, furnished ‘aid or assistance’ in the commission of the genocide in
Srebrenica, in a sense not significantly different from that of those concepts in the
general law of international responsibility.’’37 By equating complicity in genocide with
aiding and abetting genocide, the ICJ has erroneously imposed upon the crime of
complicity in genocide the standard required of one who aids or abets, the latter of
which requires that there be a sharing of the principal perpetrator’s intent and
motive to commit genocide.
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A more faithful reading and understanding of complicity in genocide distinguishes
between specific intent and specific motive.38 There is no question that the perpetrator
of genocide must possess both the specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a
protected group (sharing national, ethnic, racial, or religious character) and the
specific motive to do so because of the group’s identity as such. The ‘‘as such’’
requirement in art. 2 of the UNCG has always been its most distinguishing
characteristic. In other words, it is because the group is of a single identity (national,
ethnic, racial, or religious) that the perpetrator exercises the intent to destroy it.
An aider or abettor of the perpetrator of genocide also shares the perpetrator’s
intention and motive to destroy the protected group. But if the protected group
occupies territory sought by the perpetrator and is attacked solely to clear the territory
of that group, then the discriminatory motive required by the UNCG would be missing
(and a prosecutor might turn to crimes against humanity as the applicable criminal
charge).
In contrast, the motive to destroy one of the protected groups as such need not be
present for complicity in genocide. Like the crime of genocide, however, the intention to
destroy in whole or in part a protected group must exist, whether the perpetrator is an
individual or a government being complicit in genocide. Indeed, it is the absence of
motive that is the raison d’eˆtre for the stand-alone crime of complicity in genocide and
distinguishes it from aiding and abetting genocide.39 This is particularly true of
governmental, as distinguished from individual, conduct. The ICJ should have
examined more diligently whether the Serbian government provided significant
support to the Bosnian Serbs from 1991 through 1995 knowing that such support
would facilitate the genocidal aims of Bosnian Serb leaders but not necessarily sharing
the motive to destroy any protected group (Bosnian Muslims) as such. Since the ICTY
found that in Srebrenica the crime of genocide was committed by at least one
individual, Bosnian Serb General Radislav Krstić (as an aider and abettor of the
crime), the real question should have been whether the Serbian government facilitated
genocide at Srebrenica through acts of complicity, not whether or not it perpetrated
genocide.
The test for Bosnia would have been to prove before the ICJ that the Serbian
government intended to destroy Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica for the purpose of
removing them from Srebrenica, not because of their protected group identity as
such.40 The Bosnian Serb forces, as well as units like the Scorpions, were the vehicles
for the activation of that intent, and yet the Serbian government need not be shown to
share both the intent and the motive of the Bosnian Serb forces. Therefore, it would
have been sufficient to show (1) that the Serbian government intended to destroy the
Bosnian Muslims, in whole or in part, for strategic purposes (such as the ultimate
creation of a larger Serbian state) and (2) that actions supporting such intent
facilitated the perpetrators of genocide on the ground in Bosnia, who were exercising
their own intention to destroy the Bosnian Muslims, in whole or in part, because
of their religious or ethnic identity as such (and that the Serbian government was
aware of that particular Bosnian Serb motive). This is not to conclude that the ICJ,
after reviewing a more substantial body of evidence, would necessarily have found the
Serbian government responsible for complicity in genocide. But the proper analytical
methodology was never applied to determine whether or not such state responsibility
existed.
The object and purpose of the UNCG to ‘‘prevent and to punish’’ the crime of
genocide would be severely undermined if government leaders, such as those
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of Serbia and Montenegro in the early 1990s, knew that so long as they did not exhibit
both the intent to destroy a protected group, in whole or in part, and the motive to
destroy such a group because of its group identity, then their government would be free
to facilitate the crime of genocide without incurring any consequence under arts. 2 or 3
of the UNCG. Indeed, under the ICJ’s analysis, a government could avoid a technical
finding of complicity in genocide and subsequently punish (or help others to punish) a
few individuals as individual perpetrators, without ever incurring state responsibility
under the law for facilitating, with specific intent, a genocidal campaign of
extraordinary gravity and consequence. In the end, the government’s objective
of genocidal slaughters could be accomplished without establishing any state
responsibility under the UNCG. Yet the same government could redeem itself under
the convention’s art. 1 responsibility by prosecuting (or helping others to capture and
prosecute) a few fall guys (and, perhaps, who knows, making sure their families lived
comfortably and happily ever after). This may indeed be the outcome if Belgrade
finally turns Ratko Mladić over to the ICTY and, having avoided state responsibility
for complicity in genocide, demonstrates its compliance with the ICJ’s judgment that
it must follow through on its responsibility to punish under art. 1 of the UNCG.

The Elephant in the Room
A broad swath of the majority’s judgment describes atrocities in Bosnia and
Herzegovina that the Bosnian government presented as evidence to the court.41
The majority relied heavily on the ICTY’s examination of such evidence in cases for
individual criminal responsibility heard by that tribunal. In no event, including
Srebrenica, did the ICJ find the necessary specific intent to commit genocide on the part
of the Serbian government. However, the court repeatedly inferred that a different
conclusion might have been reached had it had jurisdiction to examine the same events
through the prism of crimes against humanity or war crimes.42 In the absence of
the high hurdle imposed by the specific intent requirement of genocide, it would
probably have been easier to establish the responsibility of the Serbian government for
the other atrocity crimes suggested by the court in the majority judgment.
Thus, if the court had had the opportunity to adjudicate not only allegations of
genocide but also allegations of crimes against humanity and war crimes for which the
Serbian government bears direct or indirect state responsibility, then the world might
have read a very different, and more realistic, judgment by the ICJ majority on
26 February 2007. It would have been instructive to the international community for
the majority to point out this factor more emphatically in its decision, at least as a
‘‘what if ’’ scenario that it might have acknowledged it was precluded from exploring for
jurisdictional reasons. In fact, however, we are left with the misleading impression
that a judicial ruling has been made that Serbia as a state committed no crimes,
because the ICJ majority found that it did not commit genocide. But what if the
Serbian government perpetrated, or facilitated the commission of, crimes against
humanity or war crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Imagine how different the ICJ’s
judgment might have been if it had the jurisdiction to explore allegations relating
to these categories of atrocity crimes.
The majority decision in Bosnia v. Serbia places in sharp focus the entire dilemma
posed by the constraints of the UNCG in the realm of atrocity crimes and the need to
establish state responsibility, with requisite penalties under the law, for crimes
against humanity and serious war crimes. No international treaty exists for the
totality of crimes against humanity that is comparable to the UNCG’s coverage of the
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crime of genocide. As for war crimes, the Geneva Conventions of 194943 and the 1977
Additional Protocols I and II44 do not contain compromissory clauses granting
jurisdiction to the ICJ to adjudicate any dispute between or among states parties
regarding the interpretation or application of the relevant treaty. Each of the Geneva
Conventions treats violations of its provisions in a strictly collaborative manner,
beginning with an inquiry, the procedure for which is either agreed upon by the
interested parties or decided by an umpire selected by agreement among the interested
parties. The relevant Geneva Convention then states, ‘‘Once the violation has been
established, the Parties to the conflict shall put an end to it and shall repress it with
the least possible delay.’’45 Nothing more is said about the state’s responsibility or
about what court, if any, has jurisdiction to adjudicate an allegation of a state party’s
non-compliance with the relevant Geneva Convention.
Significantly, Additional Protocol I requires that
A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the Conventions or of this
Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible
for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.46

Nonetheless, neither the ICJ nor any other international court is granted any
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of governmental non-compliance with either
Additional Protocol I or Additional Protocol II. The only clear way to seek payment
of compensation for a violation as described in Protocol I would be through political,
or perhaps economic or military, pressure.
Despite its historic confirmation that states can be held responsible for the crime of
genocide under the UNCG, the ICJ’s judgment in Bosnia v. Serbia reveals a major gap
in the international law of state responsibility: There is no codified enforcement
mechanism to hold states accountable for crimes against humanity and war crimes,
which typically originate in and are managed by governments and are unleashed more
frequently than genocide. These other atrocity crimes can be prosecuted against
individuals in the ICC and in other international and hybrid criminal tribunals, but
they remain strangely alien to forums of state responsibility.
The needs of international society have come full circle. State conduct was
historically the central concern, and it has become so again. State responsibility
requires a new codification exercise for crimes against humanity and war crimes, so
that states can be held accountable for such crimes under the law in the same manner
as the UNCG enables for state responsibility for genocide. In light of the convention’s
precedent and of the judgments of the international and hybrid criminal tribunals, the
task is theoretically plausible. Capturing the political will to further discipline states
in their conduct toward civilian populations and foreign military forces will be the
greatest challenge. My bet is on the inevitability of the endeavor.
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knowledge of the genocide set to unfold in Srebrenica. Taken together, these facts clearly
establish that Belgrade was, if not fully integrated in, then fully aware of the decisionmaking processes regarding Srebrenica, while the Republika Srpska itself was excluded.
Even after the fact, negotiations following the fall of Srebrenica and the genocide
committed there were held simultaneously with General Mladić and President Milošević.
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General Mladić, and his involvement in the detail of the negotiations of 14 and
15 July [1995], by that time he must have known of the change in plans made by the VRS
command on 12 or 13 July [1995] and consequently he must have known that they had
formed the intent to destroy in part the protected group. I am convinced that that
knowledge of the Respondent [Serbia] is proved to the necessary standard stated by the
Court in its Judgment (paragraph 209).’’ Ibid., para. 15. Judge Bennouna shared the same
view, and his declaration, written in French, was summarized by the court as stating that
he ‘‘considers that all the elements were present to justify a finding by the Court of
complicity on the part of the authorities in Belgrade: not only the various forms of
assistance they provided to Republicka Srpska and its army but also the knowledge they
had or should have had of the genocidal intention of the principal perpetrator of the
massacre at Srebrenica.’’ Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia),
Summary of the judgment of 26 February 2007, Annex to Summary 2007/2, http://www.
icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum¼667&code¼bhy&p1¼3&p2¼3&case¼91&k¼f4&p3¼5
(accessed 14 May 2007). Vice-President Al-Khasawneh approaches the issue holistically:
‘‘The Court likewise failed to appreciate the definitional complexity of the crime of genocide
and the need for a comprehensive approach in appreciating closely related facts, the role of
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